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Abstract 
The present paper presents an overview of contemporary reasoning research to 
examine the evidence for and implications of the Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning. 
The Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning proposes that there are two types of 
reasoning strategy applied in deductive reasoning – counterexample and statistical. 
The paper considers Mental Models Theory and The Probability Heuristics Model as 
candidate specifications for these respective strategies and hypotheses are 
proposed on this basis. The Dual Strategy Model is further considered in the context 
of Dual Process theory, the Dual Source Model and Meta-reasoning and implications 
of the synergy between these proposals are considered. We finally consider the Dual 
Strategy Model in the context of individual differences, and normative considerations 
before proposing novel hypotheses and further avenues of research which we argue 
require exploration in this context. 
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Introduction 
 
Deductive reasoning - the capacity to evaluate the logical validity of a 
conclusion based upon its premises - is a fundamental aspect of human cognition 
(e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), and understanding its variability remains an 
essential problem for cognitive science to address. Historically there was a debate 
over the fundamental deductive mechanism employed when reasoning (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994), but this has been superseded by the view that an 
array of strategies can be employed (Ford, 1995; Roberts, 1993; 2000; Verschueren, 
Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005a, 2005b). There has also been a switch to viewing 
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reasoning processes through the lens of dual process theory whereby process are 
fast, effortless and heuristic (Type 1) or slow, effortful and analytic (Type 2). Over the 
last decade the ‘new paradigm’ in reasoning research has moved the emphasis away 
from normatively sanctioned logical benchmarks as a gold standard, and towards 
understanding and describing individual differences in interpretation, processing, 
metacognition and strategy (e.g., Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Roberts, Newstead, & 
Griggs, 2001; Stupple & Ball, 2014). 
One innovative response to this development is the dual-strategy model of 
reasoning which proposes that individuals have access to both statistical and 
counterexample strategies (Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 2015b; Verschueren, 
Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005a, 2005b). Thus individuals differ in their strategy 
preference and these strategies have differing processing demands and response 
outcomes. Counterexample strategies are typically slow and effortful and place higher 
demands on working memory, this contrasts with statistical strategies which are faster 
and entail a lower working memory demand (e.g. Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 
2015b). The model is broadly consistent with a dual-process framework, with each of 
the strategies featuring similar characteristics to Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning 
processes, however there are important contrasts between these theoretical 
proposals (Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 2015b), as both statistical and 
counterexample strategies include Type 1 and Type 2 processes.  
In the following literature review we present a brief overview of classic 
theoretical proposals that are candidates to underpin the different strategies (Mental 
Models Theory and the Probability Heuristic Model), before moving on to consider the 
evidence base for the theory. We further consider the Dual Strategy Model in the 
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context of meta-reasoning, soft normativism and individual differences, and propose 
further avenues of research that we argue require exploration in this context. 
Mental Models 
 
Johnson-Laird (1983) proposed the Mental Models Theory (MMT) by adapting 
the proposal that ‘small-scale models’ of reality are constructed through perception 
(Craik, 1943), to the reasoning domain. This view was developed and refined into the 
MMT we know today. The contemporary MMT makes three main assumptions about 
model construction (Johnson-Laird, 2001; 2006): 1. Each model is representative of a 
possibility; 2. Models are iconic: the components and structure of the model 
correspond to the components and structure of the possibility; 3. Models represent 
what is true, but not what is false (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999). This process occurs 
in three stages. In the comprehension stage, reasoners use pragmatic understanding 
of language, and general knowledge, to interpret the premises and construct a model 
of them. During the description stage, a parsimonious model is formulated that 
integrates the premises and contains information not explicitly stated in them and is a 
putative conclusion to them. Finally, the validation phase is a search for 
counterexamples to falsify the putative conclusion. If no counterexamples are found 
the conclusion can be accepted.  However, not all participants engage in the search 
for counterexamples. 
 MMT predicts that as the number of models required increases so does the 
difficulty in making an inference; and that multiple model problems take longer and 
exhibit more errors (Johnson-Laird, 2001). Errors and processing time predictions are 
related to the limitations of working memory, as the consideration of multiple models 
can overload its capacity (e.g., Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998). Syllogistic Figure 
further influences the working memory demand whereby figures without contiguous 
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middle terms require the reordering of premises or switching the order of terms within 
premise(s) through a conversion process (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Stupple & Ball, 
2007). MMT further predicts that individuals spontaneously develop a variety of model 
building strategies for deductive inferences with increased experience, for example, 
considering the most informative premise first (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999).  
If MMT is an accurate description of the counterexample strategy in dual-
strategy theory, these predictions should hold for reasoners who prefer a 
counterexample-based approach. Indeed, it includes possibility of meta-strategies 
within this group whereby variations in counterexample search and model building 
strategies should vary based on reasoning experience and/or aptitude. There is also 
evidence that many reasoners do not move beyond their initial model to search for 
counterexamples when generating conclusions from premises rather than evaluating 
presented conclusions. These individuals may be better characterized as having a 
dichotomous interpretation of the truth value of the conclusion rather than employing 
a counterexample strategy, they could still show less influence from the statistical 
information than those who prefer a statistical strategy, but not go beyond their first 
mental model.   
Probability Heuristic Model 
Classic paradigms in the psychology of deduction were based on binary logic 
whereby all assertions can be allocated one of two values: true or false. However, a 
Bayesian view of cognition challenged this approach (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), with probability theory or Bayes 
theorem considered as the normative standard against which reasoning should be 
judged - (e.g., Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Elqayam & Over, 2013), and the view that 
deductive reasoning was probabilistic rather than logical. When initiating the dual 
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strategy perspective Verschueren, et al. (2005a; 2005b) proposed a minimalist view 
of the probabilistic/statistical strategy. However, in the present paper we explore the 
more highly specified Probability Heuristics Model (PHM), proposed by Chater and 
Oaksford (1999) as a putative account of the statistical strategy – particularly in the 
context of syllogistic reasoning.  
PHM proposes that individuals employ heuristics to yield a probabilistically valid 
(p-valid) conclusion. The application of probabilistic heuristics has a number of 
assumptions. First, that different quantifiers vary in their informativeness such that 
some quantifiers are more informative than others. Second, some quantified 
assertions entail others (p – entailment). For example, the use of a ‘particular’, Some 
or Some are not, rather than a ‘universal’, All or No, implies that the universal 
statement is incorrect. In conjunction with these principles, reasoners apply 
probabilistic generation and testing heuristics to produce conclusions (see Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999, p.196-202). One example is the min-heuristic which prevents the 
generation of conclusions that are more informative than the least informative premise. 
 PHM proposes that these assumptions and heuristics combine to provide a 
complete description of the processes that underlie reasoning. Indeed, the model has 
been successfully applied to a variety of reasoning problems, previously explained by 
models subscribing to logic as the norm against which reasoning is measured, 
including conditional inference (e.g. Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000;), the Wason 
Selection task (e.g. Oaksford, Chater, & Grainger, 1999) and syllogistic reasoning 
problems (e.g. Chater & Oaksford, 1999).  Similarly, work on syllogistic reasoning has 
also offered empirical support for the PHM demonstrating that the PHM can be 
extended to syllogisms featuring quantifiers such as ‘Most’ and ‘Few’ which have no 
logical conclusion (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). From the perspective of a Dual Strategy 
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Model the PHM allows a detailed specification of likelihood assessments derived from 
the properties of the quantifiers, which would occur in conjunction with any contextual 
or belief driven influences on conclusion plausibility.  
The PHM is not without criticism: ‘No valid conclusion’ responses are not well 
explained by the model (Hattori, 2016); and there is some debate over the conclusions 
that should be produced (e.g., Elflein & Ragni, 2018; Hattori, 2016). Such issues could 
be avoided if the Probability Heuristic Model described a possible strategy rather than 
a fundamental reasoning mechanism. For example, no valid conclusion responses 
can be predicted by counterexample strategies, particularly if participants have 
interpreted the task as requiring a judgment of logical necessity (or if we allow the 
possibility of mid-task strategy switching among some reasoners). Finally, some 
authors suggest PHM as a dual process account with Type 1 heuristics to generate 
conclusions and test procedures to determine p-validity (e.g., Schroyens, Schaeken & 
Handley, 2003), as we will see later, this view aligns well with statistical strategies as 
outlined by Markovits and colleagues. 
The Dual-Strategy Model 
 
The dual-strategy model originated from work by Verschueren, Schaeken and 
d’Ydawelle (2005a; 2005b) and proposed that reasoners employ two qualitatively 
different strategies for deductive reasoning: statistical and counterexample. This 
model combines the explanations of counterexample models, derived from MMT (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and probabilistic theories (e.g. Oaksford et al, 2009) 
and presents them as strategies rather than unitary frameworks. Counterexample 
strategies are associated with dichotomous assessments of validity and involve higher 
cognitive demand and increased working memory load – particularly where 
participants move beyond basic model description. In comparison, statistical 
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strategies are faster, intuitive and require fewer cognitive resources –aligning with 
aspects of dual process theory but with notable caveats.  
For instance, according to Markovits, Brisson and de Chantal (2016) the dual-
strategy model does not, however, describe a pure heuristic process, rather, the model 
focuses on the way in which logical inferences are made. The essential distinction of 
the model is that underlying statistical information from knowledge about the premises 
can influence the way the information is processed. Statistical strategies are 
essentially Bayesian and generate estimates of presented/generated conclusions 
being true (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Oaksford et al., 2000). This contrasts with 
counterexample strategies whereby the ease with which a counterexample can be 
generated is dependent on both the logical structure of the problem and the likelihood 
of the conclusion given our knowledge of reality – as the number of plausible 
counterexamples increases so does the likelihood of a rejection. (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
2001).  
Support for the dual-strategy model of reasoning derives from a series of 
studies conducted by Markovits and colleagues (e.g. Markovits, Brisson, & de Chantal, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016; Markovits, Brisson, de Chantal, & Singmann, 2018; Markovits, 
Brisson, de Chantal, & Thompson, 2017; Markovits, Brunet, Thompson, & Brisson, 
2013; Markovits, Lortie Forgues, & Brunet, 2012) which provide strong evidence for 
the distinction between counterexample and statistical strategies. Markovits et al. 
(2012) developed a method to distinguish between these reasoning strategies, by 
presenting problems accompanied by statistical information that described the 
likelihood of the putative conclusion. Individuals who rejected low probability 
conclusions more frequently were identified as adopting a statistical strategy. In 
contrast, individuals who were not influenced by the presence of statistical information 
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were considered to adopt a counterexample strategy. There does however, remain 
the question as to whether these strategic preferences exist on a continuum or as a 
dichotomy. 
Under time constraints, individuals preferentially adopt a statistical reasoning 
strategy (Markovits et al., 2013), but when reasoning without time constraints, 
reasoners preferred a counterexample strategy. This supports the argument that 
statistical strategies are less cognitively demanding than counterexample strategies, 
consistent with the prediction of the dual-strategy model, and indeed dual-process 
frameworks more generally. However, the task characteristics that encourage this 
preference warrant further consideration and replication with alternative paradigms 
and instruction sets. Response-time effects have shown that deductive inferences are 
typically faster when reasoners adopt a statistical strategy (Markovits et al., 2016). 
These experiments demonstrate some clear commonalities with standard dual 
process theories and it was a logical step for Markovits and colleagues to apply this 
approach to belief bias. 
The dual-strategy model predicts a greater tendency to base responses on 
conclusion believability when a statistical strategy is used, because beliefs can drive 
likelihood assessments of conclusion. Across three different forms of reasoning, 
effects of conclusion belief were observed to be stronger for statistical strategies, 
compared to counterexample strategies (Markovits et al., 2017). Belief bias was 
stronger with probabilistic strategies, but was not eliminated among those using 
counterexample strategies. Ball and Stupple (2016) described three categories of dual 
process theory of belief bias: Default Interventionist, Parallel and Hybrid accounts - it 
is also not clear-cut which category of belief bias theory best explains the data. Within 
the Default-Interventionist account a dominant, default intuition is initially generated by 
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Type 1 processing, which may be overridden by Type 2 processing. This intervention 
can occur when there is a lack of confidence in the default conclusion and cognitive 
resources are sufficient. Default responses generated by Type 1 processes are often 
convincing, and initiating Type 2 processing requires significant cognitive effort 
(Stanovich, 2009; Thompson, 2009) so Type 1 can win-out. Default interventionist 
explanations typically assume a mental models as representations (e.g., Evans, 2000; 
Stupple, Ball, Evans & Kamal-Smith 2011), but it would be possible to develop a 
probabilistic default interventionist account where defaults were derived from intuitive 
belief, but could be overridden by test procedures determining p-validity.  
In contrast, parallel-processing models propose that both Type 1 and Type 2 
occur simultaneously (e.g. Sloman, 1996) with Type 1 outcomes being suppressed 
when conflict generates meta-cognitive uncertainty. These models could also have 
more probabilistic specifications. Finally, hybrid dual-process theories offer a further 
alternative (Bago & De Neys, 2017; Handley & Trippas, 2015), whereby serial and 
parallel mechanisms that include intuitive heuristics and logical or probabilistic 
intuitions deliver Type 1 outputs that can coincide or conflict. When these processes 
deliver conflicting outcomes analytic processing is triggered to reduce metacognitive 
uncertainty by resolving the conflict. Hybrid accounts require little modification to 
include Type 1 processes based on beliefs/context and probabilistic heuristics applied 
to quantifier combinations. Evidence for multiple sources of intuition feeding into the 
reasoning process is now well established (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Handley & Trippas, 
2015; Trippas, Handley, Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016) and these factors would be 
expected with either strategy, that belief based intuition has more impact in 
probabilistic strategies.  
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Hybrid models of belief bias are consistent with the proposals from Trippas, 
Thompson, and Handley (2017) who show evidence of slow belief responses and fast 
logic responses. They also concur with the dual-source model which proposes that, 
individuals must combine prior knowledge of information surrounding the subject 
matter and information concerning logical form (Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014; 
Singman, Klauer, & Beller, 2016). Hybrid and dual-source models are in broad 
agreement that there are intuitions based on knowledge/belief /context and upon the 
logical form/probabilistic heuristics/pragmatics that influence reasoning processes and 
outcomes – the precise specifications, such as the extent to which these processes 
conform to the characteristics of Type 1, how conflict is resolved and how they 
generalise across different tasks with differing complexities remains an open question 
for the field.   
Markovits et al. (2018) combined the dual-source model, with the dual-strategy 
model, and demonstrated that logical form influenced deductive inference equally for 
both counterexample and statistical reasoners. Logical form was also observed to 
influence probabilistic inferences that used explicit statistical information although 
these findings were less clear-cut. This nuanced finding requires further unpacking in 
future studies to explore whether intuitive influences derived from logic or belief have 
the same underlying mechanism irrespective of the strategy adopted, or whether task 
interpretation and intuitions differ between strategy groups. We concur with Markovits 
et al. that understanding the effects of logical form, reasoning strategy and the form of 
inference is a minimum requirement for a complete theoretical account of deductive 
inference. However, we would go further and suggest that a comprehensive deductive 
reasoning theory should also predict individual differences based on working memory 
capacity, cognitive disposition, perceived normative standards that the participants 
Running head: Mental Models or Probabilistic Reasoning or Both 
 
Sensitivity: Internal 
work towards, and the interpretation of the quantifiers and connectives. These 
individual differences impact upon the metacognitive processes and meta-reasoning 
that are central to strategy selection (and perseverance with or abandonment of that 
strategy), as well as the degree of confidence required to endorse a solution (and the 
calibration between this and response accuracy).  
A metacognitive account of reasoning process is a vital component in any 
reasoning theory, as the act of monitoring and controlling reasoning processes, and 
allocating cognitive resources are central to the completion or otherwise of the task 
(Thompson & Ackerman, 2017a). Ackerman and Thompson (2017a) presented a 
framework for meta-reasoning research inspired by metacognitive approaches in 
learning and memory research (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 
2013). Much metacognition research focused on learning and memory and their 
associated monitoring and control processes, but the metacognitive processes that 
underlie reasoning (or meta-reasoning) and problem solving (Ackerman & Thompson, 
2017a, 2017b; Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013), are an increasing priority.  
 One fruitful approach to examining meta-reasoning processes is that applied 
by Thompson and colleagues (e.g., Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) 
which has focused on feeling of rightness (FOR) using a two-response methodology. 
The two-response methodology requires participants to quickly provide a first 
response, then rate the FOR about this response before being offered the opportunity 
to revise it. This methodology was applied to the min-heuristic demonstrating that min-
conclusions resulted in stronger FOR and were also processed more quickly, than 
non-min-conclusions. Additionally, min-conclusions were less frequently reassessed 
and fewer changes in responses were given to these conclusions. These data support 
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at least this component of PHM as a candidate for Type 1 elements of statistical 
reasoning strategies. 
However, as FOR are the result of heuristic cues, the amount of time allocated 
to reanalysing the initial response may not be indicative of problem difficulty or 
cognitive load (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017b). Indeed, as answer fluency is related 
to heuristic cues, incorrect answers can be given with high levels of confidence 
(Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Familiarity with problem content 
also has a similar effect of producing high levels of confidence in incorrect answers 
(Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). However, it 
is also possible in some cases that FOR can indeed reflect problem difficulty, such as 
in the presence of conflicting answers (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; 
Thompson et al., 2011). 
Despite the developing evidence for the metacognitive processes involved in 
the initiation and termination of analytic thinking, more work is required to explore the 
metacognitive processes that underlie strategy selection. Beilock and deCaro, (2007) 
investigated the costs of selecting strategies, and found that the least demanding 
strategy is the most likely to be selected. Further research on the monitoring and 
control processes that influence strategy selection is also needed. Reder and Ritter 
(1992) demonstrated that strategy selection may be impaired by monitoring processes 
that are based on misleading information. The processes associated with strategy 
selection may be based on heuristic cues and thus the reliability of such cues should 
influence the quality of strategy selection (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017b).  
Determining the extent to which strategy selection is volitional or implicit is a further 
consideration – particularly as Roberts (2000) has argued that participants are capable 
of switching strategy between tasks or even across trials using the same tasks. Some 
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participants in the Dual strategy paradigm demonstrated strong preferences for 
statistical or counterexample approaches, but others were less clear cut – these 
individuals may indeed be strategy switchers.   
In a novel study Bajšanski, Žauhar, and Valerjev (2018) applied metacognitive 
methods to syllogistic reasoning tasks and examined the extent to which consensuality 
effects generalise from general knowledge tasks to reasoning. They demonstrated that 
while confidence and accuracy were not strongly correlated, participants were more 
confident when generating the most common answers to the reasoning problems. This 
methodology is an excellent approach to identifying commonalities between reasoners 
and can help to identify the cues that influence reasoning processes and outcomes. 
This approach may be particularly valuable in the context of the Dual Strategy theory 
as the different outcomes for statistical and counterexample reasoners would suggest 
a lack of commonality between these groups. Applying this method to the different 
groups may identify different patterns of consensuality and help to triangulate the 
different properties of the strategies. 
 Metacognitive processes have been shown to play a vital role in initiating (e.g. 
Markovits et al., 2015; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2011; 
Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2014) and terminating (e.g. Ackerman, 2014) analytic 
thinking, as well as strategy selection (e.g. Broder & Newell, 2008; Reder & Ritter, 
1992; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; Markovits et al., 2013). As such, developing 
understanding of these processes is essential to expanding our understanding of 
reasoning, and potentially, improving performance (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017b). 
Future directions and conclusions 
It is our view that the has immense promise in explaining the extreme variability 
in reasoning performance. Perhaps the great strength of the approach is its 
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compatibility with other perspectives, with success and potential to draw upon classic 
theories proposed as fundamental deductive mechanisms, dual process theory and 
dual source models, as well as the important development in meta-reasoning.  We 
would contend however, that while the integration of such a range of paradigms makes 
for an exciting prospect we would caution that this will generate as many new 
questions as it does answers. In this final section we outline a modest range of 
proposals to further extend the approach. 
The Dual Strategy Model has a good evidence base thus far, but the detailed 
specification of the mechanisms in the two strategies involved requires further 
empirical demonstration to determine where the limits of the generalisability lie. We 
argue that there is much potential in the use of MMT and PHM as candidate 
specifications for the two strategies. The fact that these accounts are so highly 
specified, with a substantial range of well-established effects is double-edged as it 
allows for strong predictions but also reduces the parsimony of the account.  
One empirically testable contrast between statistical and counterexample 
strategies based upon the contrast between MMT and PHM is the role of syllogistic 
figure. A counter example strategy based on MMT principles would entail a cognitive 
load associated with integrating the premises to form a mode in the description stage 
when the middle terms of the problem are not contiguous (e.g., figure BACB should 
be more demanding than ABBC, cf. Stupple & Ball, 2007). In contrast to MMT the PHM 
makes no strong predictions about syllogistic figure and a more general statistical 
strategy would not necessarily require a premise integration process and as such 
would not show this differential cognitive load. 
At the core of the Dual Strategy Model is the assumption of individual 
differences and that these differences can be fundamental to the way that individuals 
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approach their reasoning. However, there is an extensive literature on individual 
differences in reasoning that has not yet been applied to the model (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 2000). An examination of the individual differences in cognitive ability, 
disposition, interpretation, response time and motivation of reasoners who apply 
different strategies is likely to be prudent. It would be predicted – in line with dual 
process predictions (e.g., Stupple et al. 2011; Stupple, Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, & Steel 
2017; Stupple & Ball, 2014) that participants who respond faster (using a statistical 
strategy) may be more likely to be cognitive misers with lower working memory spans 
(Stupple, Gale & Richmond, 2013). It is a further possibility that statistical strategies 
represent a failure or absence of ‘decoupling’ the problem from the mental simulation 
of its solution (Toplak & Stanovich 2012). In the present context this would entail 
suspending pragmatic, contextual and belief-driven elements of a problem to enable 
hypothetical thinking about its abstract properties - in line with view of Type 2 thinking 
at its purest. 
We would argue that adopting a ‘soft normativist’ approach (e.g., Stupple & 
Ball, 2014) would facilitate this – soft normativism allows for normative evaluations of 
reasoning performance alongside the pursuit of descriptive research goals. Thus, the 
unnecessary constraints of rigid normativism and the slippery slope of strong 
relativism in judging the outcomes of our reasoning processes are avoided. For 
example, the use of Bayesian and Logic based normative benchmarks may be 
instructive as to the strategies being employed because different participants may view 
these different standards as appropriate to the task at hand.  Indeed, the recruitment 
of participants untrained in logic raises the possibility that task interpretation involves 
an informal or naïve reflective equilibrium whereby participants attempt to give the 
most rational response available in line with normative standards they are aware of or 
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reasoning strategies they deem appropriate to reach their goal (see Stupple & Ball, 
2014 for further description of this view). Where a participant judges the reasoning 
task as one of determining the plausibility of the conclusion rather than its logical 
necessity (a judgement for which they may lack the requisite mindware) a probabilistic 
strategy could be considered a reasonable, rational approach.  
In conclusion, the recent developments in the reasoning literature: the Dual 
Strategy Model, dual-source (e.g., Singmann et al., 2014) and Hybrid models (Bago & 
De Neys, 2017) and the increasing focus on Meta-reasoning (Thompson & Ackerman, 
2017a) offer considerable optimism for the reasoning domain. Dual-process theories 
require more nuanced specification to address the critics of the approach (e.g., Keren 
& Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) and these new approaches – dual 
strategy, dual-source and meta-reasoning provide the means to answer this challenge 
within a dual process framework.  
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